Mediating Policy Competition Through Campus Development in Dutch Limburg by Kooij, H.J.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/179690
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-15 and may be subject to
change.
WINDOW ON THE NETHERLANDS
MEDIATING POLICY COMPETITION THROUGH
CAMPUS DEVELOPMENT IN DUTCH LIMBURG
HENK-JAN KOOIJ
Department of Human Geography, Institute for Management Research, Radboud University, PO Box
9108, 6500 HK Nijmegen, the Netherlands. E-mail: h.kooij@fm.ru.nl
Received: June 2015; accepted November 2016
ABSTRACT
Over the past decades, governments have switched from a managerial to an entrepreneurial
style of governance in the strengthening of certain places at the expense of others. This
coevolved with an increase in inter-urban and inter-regional competition for resources, also
called ‘policy competition’. The issue for regional governments is how they balance their wish to
strengthen their economic structure, without creating conflicts of unfair competition in the
designation of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. This paper addresses this balancing act in the Dutch
Province of Limburg, where a multinational threatened to leave the region. The case is analysed
with the help of actor-network-theory and follows the translations through which an innovative
policy tool was constructed that allowed the Province to invest in real estate. Through the
innovative ‘campus’ concept, the Province could comfort the vested interests of the
multinational, while balancing out the interests of other economic cores in the region.
Key words: policy competition, campus development, innovation campus, Dutch Limburg,
regional economic policy, actor-network-theory
INTRODUCTION
How can regional governments strengthen
their competitiveness without creating unfair
competition? – One of the key questions for
both national and regional governments is
how they can foster economic development in
their jurisdiction, without violating the EU
rules for State Aid (Colomb & Santinha 2012).
This is even more pressing within areas facing
economic decline, where any form of employ-
ment is carefully tended. While multinationals
can shift employment to other regions, terri-
tory bound governments are left with social
problems if no new employers appear. Against
this relatively footloose situation of multina-
tionals, territory bound governments develop
strategies to maintain employment and thus
prosperity within their region, but face chal-
lenges to satisfy both the needs of local busi-
nesses and of the EU rules on competition.
Next to the formal EU rules of competition,
more informal and politically sensitive issues
arise when specific companies benefit from
state measures to promote the competitiveness
of regions (Bontje & Lawton 2013).
Theoretically, the debate has focused on
the policy competition between governments
in attracting resources from higher-tier gov-
ernments within the context of the hollowing
out of the welfare state and, at the same
time, a more entrepreneurial governance
style (see Begg 1999; Malecki 2004; Jonas
et al. 2010; While et al. 2013; Addie 2015).
The governance style of regional govern-
ments has evolved from managerial to
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entrepreneurial, focusing on fostering eco-
nomic growth within their territories (Harvey
1989). This new style co-evolved with an
increase in inter-urban and inter-regional
competition in the light of globalisation
(Malecki 2004; Jonas et al. 2010). Cities in
growth regions such as Munich, Cambridge
and Stockholm, struggle to shape a politics
that channels investments from state resour-
ces, at the expense of other less privileged
regions (see While et al. 2013). Although
encouraged by EU policies such as the Lis-
bon Agenda of the 2000s, the implementa-
tion of such an entrepreneurial style is
hardly straightforward, as conflicts arise from
‘backing winners’ at the cost of other areas
that equally deserve support (Begg 1999). In
light of the recent modes of liberal thinking
on government spending, such an entrepre-
neurial stance is under pressure and inevita-
bly leads to the support of some at the
expense of others (While et al. 2013).
While the debate has so far focused upon
more structural components of growth facili-
tation in terms of collective provision of
infrastructure, land and services (de Vor 2011;
Jonas et al. 2010; While et al. 2013; Addie
2015), the tactics of lower-tier governments in
policy competition remain underexplored.
This paper addresses this policy competition
and the issues of regional governments and
their balancing acts between unfair competi-
tion in general and binding multinationals to
their region. Two important dimensions that
shape these balancing acts are the economic
context within the region, that is, what other
firms or developments can claim resources
from the region, and the dovetailing with
broader policy discourses (Begg 1999; While
et al. 2013). Consequently, the research ques-
tion is as follows: how can regional govern-
ments strengthen their competitiveness
through the facilitation of ‘winners’ without
creating unfair competition?
This research question is answered with the
help of a case study on the Dutch Province of
Limburg, a province in the south of the Neth-
erlands (see Figure 1). This region has faced
serious economic and demographic decline
since the end of the mining industry in 1973
(Elzerman & Bontje 2013). While some of the
pain has been remedied through bringing in
public services such as Statistics Netherlands
(Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek), the Tax
Administration (Belastingdienst) and Maas-
tricht University (UM), its economic structure
has been dominated by the chemical industry
multinational the Dutch State Mines (DSM)
(Dohmen 2007; Elzerman & Bontje 2013;
Jeannet & Schreuder 2015).
This history of Limburg has fuelled the
need for economic development strategies
through ‘cluster development’, which were
launched through the ‘acceleration agenda’
of 2003, aimed at the strengthening of the
‘power clusters’ of ‘chemistry’, ‘health care &
cure’, ‘agro-food/nutrition’ and ‘new energy’
(Jacobs & Kooij 2013. These clusters mir-
rored the economic cores of the province
(i.e. DSM in Geleen, UM in Maastricht,
Greenport in Venlo and Solland Solar in
Heerlen/Aachen on AVANTIS) and thus bal-
anced the interests of the economic cores.
The province’s policy was aimed at shaping
the right preconditions for these clusters
through general provincial policies, for
example, mobility, labor market and educa-
tion (Taskforce Versnellingsagenda 2005).
However, in 2008, the Province developed
new policies for the development of specific
areas within these clusters, aimed at ‘campus
development’ (Jacobs & Kooij 2013), in which
it prioritised the developments around DSM’s
Chemelot Campus in Geleen and around
UM’s Health Science Campus in Maastricht,
above developments in Venlo and Heerlen. In
contrast to the Province’s cluster policy
between 2005 and 2008, two specific sites ben-
efited from the province’s new policy. This
paper focuses on this tension and analyses the
policy development in the Province on a
micro-level to understand the issues involved
with the balancing between unfair competi-
tion and strengthening the competitiveness of
the region. It does so by focusing on the
‘translation’ and ‘net-working’ effects of the
campus concept within the region of Lim-
burg, with specific attention to the policy
sphere of the Dutch Province of Limburg.
Actor-network-theory as a way to understand
the micro-politics and tactics in Limburg –
The mainstream literature on policy competi-
tion is dedicated to comparative case studies
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on a general level to equate collective provi-
sion competition in one region with another.
This approach highlights the general patterns
and issues of policy competition, but excludes
detailed insights in the tactics and micro-
politics of policy competition. Therefore, this
 Legend
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Figure 1. Campuses and clusters in Dutch Limburg. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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paper uses the perspective of actor-network-
theory (ANT), drawing upon the work of Cal-
lon (1986), Law (1992, 2008) and Latour
(1986, 2005). This approach focuses on the
relations between actors to understand the
entities that we encounter in our world, such
as organisations, machines, knowledge, docu-
ments etc. In ANT, both things and ideas are
conceived of as actors, hence, actor-network-
theory (Murdoch 2006; Hendrikx 2014).
Central is the emergence and disintegration
of relations between entities that form actor-
networks, mainly analysed through tracing
relations between entities. The building of
relations is referred to as ‘translation’, mean-
ing the circulation, transformation and repre-
sentation of ‘things’, which also includes the
orchestration, ordering and resistance of these
processes.1
The networks of actors can be traced by
following the actors and their flows (Latour
2005). This study traced the translations of
the campus concept by analysing policy docu-
ments, minutes of Provincial State meetings
and commission meetings, press releases and
newspaper articles, all referred to in the text.
Fourteen semi-structured interviews were car-
ried out with different actors involved in the
campus plan, including civil servants of the
province and officials working on particular
campus developments, a member of the Pro-
vincial Executive, and both present and for-
mer officials of the regional investment
agency LIOF.
The analytical framework focuses on four
moments of translation: problematisation, inter-
essement, enrolment and mobilisation (Callon
1986). Problematisation is the process through
which an actor makes itself indispensable in
the light of a constructed problem. Interesse-
ment includes how allies are locked into place
in the light of a problematisation. Enrolment
entails how roles of actors are defined and
co-ordinated. Mobilisation implies the emer-
gence of faithful and representative spokes-
men for the entire network. As mentioned
before, translations and networking do not
occur in a vacuum, but ideas and things are
circulated through intermediaries in the
form of texts, technical objects, embodied
practices and money (Callon 1991; Latour
1986).
In what follows, this paper analyses the
translation of the campus across the region
using the four moments of translation, from
a private initiative of DSM in 2003, towards
the public embrace of the campus in 2014 by
the Province of Limburg as an important pol-
icy tool.
CAMPUS DEVELOPMENT IN LIMBURG
The issue: the withdrawal of DSM – In 2003,
DSM decided to develop a ‘research campus’
in Geleen, a ‘business campus’, distinct from
the conventional notion of ‘university cam-
pus’ (DSM & LIOF 2003; Netherlands Acad-
emy of Technology and Innovation 2003;
DSM 2004b). This decision was a conse-
quence of DSM’s renewed strategy to with-
draw from bulk chemistry and to focus on
life sciences and chemical materials, which
eventually led to the sale of DSM’s petro-
chemical businesses to Saudi Basic Industries
Corp (SABIC) in 2002 (DSM 2013). The
Research Campus was constructed as a place
to open up DSM’s work terrain to ‘techno
starters’ and the research and development
(R&D) divisions of other companies. Open-
ing up for other companies was framed as a
step forward, but the action was mainly a
strategy to find new tenants for the site’s
vacant real estate, a financial problem for
DSM (Netherlands Academy of Technology
and Innovation 2003; DSM & LIOF 2003;
DSM 2004b). Until 2005, this real estate initi-
ative was essentially part of DSM’s private
strategy and -in contrast to the developments
later in the process – not one that was
actively supported by the government or
other actors.
Problematisation: how to keep DSM in the
region? – DSM’s withdrawal from the region
was exemplified by its operation called
‘Copernicus’ (2002–04). This was a restruc-
turing operation that included the loss of
around 500 jobs in manufacturing and sup-
port services (DSM 2004a). In 2004, the
operation led to protests from the trades
unions, which ultimately led to an agreement
between the unions, DSM, the municipality
of Sittard-Geleen and the Province of
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Limburg, which stated that DSM would make
an effort to attract new job opportunities
(Chemelot 2013).
This retreat was recognised by the provin-
ce’s civil servants, who started to explore how
to bind DSM to the region. In the next part
of this paper, we follow these civil servants
from the strategy department, because they
can be considered essential in the translation
process. It was these civil servants that started
to explore strategies to bind DSM to the
region. At that time, the ruling economic
policy was the cluster policy, and they
explored possibilities to bind DSM physically
to the region through cluster development,
but these were not fit for this purpose.
From 2006, however, visits to Basel, con-
tacts with Martin Hinoul of the Interuniver-
sity Microelectronics Centre (IMEC) in
Leuven, and visits to the High Tech Campus
in Eindhoven (HTC) made the civil servants
realise that ‘campus development’ could play
a role in the cluster development. IMEC
Leuven and HTC in Eindhoven were prime
examples of a new style of campus develop-
ment also called the ‘innovation campus’
(see also Kooij 2015), in which innovation
and regional-economic policy materialised in
the form of buildings dedicated to research
and development. Thus, in 2006 the provin-
ce’s civil servants took a first step to translate
‘campus development’ into existing regional
policies and the acceleration agenda. At that
time, direct investments of the Province that
would bind DSM were not possible, because
the cluster policies were mainly focused on
mobility, job market and education, etc., and
not on physical developments, so the civil
servants needed to find new opportunities to
link DSM to the region.
Interessement: from ‘power clusters’ to campus
development – After the 2007 provincial elec-
tions, the ideas of the civil servants made it
into the board of the province, since the new
provincial executives continued the accelera-
tion agenda and explored the possibilities for
campus development as the integration of dif-
ferent sectoral policies, such as physical envi-
ronment, labour market, economic policy and
innovation policy. The province’s civil servants
continued to explore campus development as
part of cluster development. One way to
anchor campus development was to couple it
with the rise of open innovation concepts
within the industry, a concept that was
embraced by DSM and Philips in 2003, but
the development was also linked to DSM’s
vacant real estate problems and its problem-
atic retreat from the region. In looking for
solutions, the civil servants tried to under-
stand what a provincial government could do
to foster such a campus development.
The province’s perspective on campus devel-
opment was articulated in a memorandum for
the Economic Provincial Council Commission
(Statencommissie Economisch Domein) in
March 2008 (Provincie Limburg 2008), which
was positively welcomed by the Commission
(Statencommissie voor het Economisch
Domein 2008). The positive receipt of this
perspective on campus development made it
in theory possible to bind DSM to the region,
but this same possibility could also be used by
other economic players in the region. The
civil servants had to restrict the extent to
which the campus concept could be applied,
in order to avoid overexploitation of the cam-
pus concept and hence overexploitation of
financial resources. This was done through
the memorandum, which was produced by the
provincial civil servants and the provincial
executive to explicitly define the campus con-
cept. The memo was not written for purely
semantic reasons because its aim was to distin-
guish between ‘real’ campuses and the ‘ordi-
nary’ industrial and business estates that were
only using the campus label for marketing rea-
sons. Moreover, the memo detailed the prov-
ince’s commitment to ‘real’ campuses and to
other initiatives that were not considered to
be ‘real’. In the memo, the province ‘acknowl-
edged’ two campus developments within the
region: the ‘Research and Business Campus’
in Geleen and the ‘Health Sciences Campus’
in Maastricht, through which the civil servants
and the executive detailed roles for both the
province and the two ‘real’ campuses in
Geleen and Maastricht (Provincie Limburg
2008). Other initiatives such as Greenport
Venlo or AVANTIS in Heerlen/Aachen were
not considered campuses by the province
because they did not meet the criteria men-
tioned in the memo (cf. Jacobs & Kooij 2013).
POLICY COMPETITION IN DUTCH LIMBURG 5
VC 2017 Royal Dutch Geographical Society KNAG
However, in line with most of the Dutch prov-
inces, the official policy was still aimed at clus-
ter development, and the decision in favour of
campus development had to be democratically
organised through the Provincial States. To
align their ideas with the prevailing policy dis-
course, the civil servants had to find a way to
interest other actors to actively argue for cam-
pus development, but how?
Interessement: in sync with the national
discourse – Two national reports on campus
development conducted for the Ministry of
Economic Affairs (EZ) in 2009 (BCI 2009;
Boekholt et al. 2009) played an important role
in aligning campus development in Limburg
with the national policy discourse. These
reports turned out to be well in line with Lim-
burg’s vision, because the provincial civil serv-
ants had actively contacted EZ and the
organisations working on the reports to
inform them about Limburg’s view and activ-
ities for campus development. This contact
proved to be very productive for the province
because the second of the two reports quali-
fied the ‘Research Campus’ in Geleen as a
‘mature campus’ of ‘national importance’ and
the ‘Maastricht Health Campus’ as a campus
in its ‘growth-phase’ and ‘potentially of
national importance’ (BCI 2009). This report
aligned the Limburg memorandum on cam-
pus development with the networks of the
national government, which made campus
development a contemporary policy tool.
Very important for the Limburg case, the
first report also explained the possible roles
for governments in campus development, with-
out transgressing the European rules concern-
ing state aid (Boekholt et al. 2009). According
to the report, it was possible for governments
to assist initiatives through investments in infra-
structure such as roads, but real estate was con-
sidered to be the limit (Boekholt et al. 2009).
Moreover, because the reports were written for
EZ and were in line with the province’s view
on the matter, the province could use these
reports to further prioritise the only two ‘real’
campuses in the province.
Enrolment: from innovation of the regional
economy to real estate development – The
network of civil servants succeeded in
involving the actors within the province with
the national discourse, but the actors still
needed to be enrolled to create and sustain
a stable network. Therefore, in 2010, the
Province enrolled DSM and UM into a con-
sortium, and they started working on a mas-
ter plan for the ‘CHEMaterials’ cluster. The
goal of the master plan was to develop the
‘Chemelot Campus’ – as it was now called
instead of ‘Research Campus’– to become
the Euro-regional and international location
for businesses, education and research organ-
isations in the ‘CHEMaterials’ (Wagemans &
Przybylski 2011). The province would con-
tribute 80 per cent of the funds for the cam-
pus’ real estate while the other two
consortium members, DSM and UM, would
each contribute 10 per cent of the funds, the
argument being ‘market failure’ (Provincie
Limburg 2011a). However, these plans had
to be approved by the provincial states,
which implied that they needed to be
enrolled, which was not an easy task as the
political landscape was scattered with three
parties in office and five in opposition.
Enrolment: the campus real estate plans in
the provincial states – The preliminary work
was done in a commission of the provincial
states, where the plans were discussed with
the representatives of the eight political par-
ties. The members of the Economic Provin-
cial Council Commission criticised the real
estate investments of the province, because
the province, in fact, was financing the solu-
tion for DSM’s written-off real estate. How-
ever, the provincial executive counter-argued
that if the province did not participate in the
real estate of the Chemelot Campus, DSM
would probably leave the region (Statencom-
missie voor het Economisch Domein 2011).
What members of the commission doubted
specifically about the campus, however, was
the amount of estimated jobs for ‘knowledge
workers’ and the consequences for semi and
unskilled workers in the region that the cam-
pus would bring. Job creation for semi and
unskilled workers was the key argument for
the Province to invest in the campus plan
and – indirectly – to support companies
and research institutes. However, in actuality,
these arguments were weak and based on
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projections. In general, the commission mem-
bers’ doubts were about the project’s goals
and assessments, so the provincial executive
decided to monitor and assess the project’s
progress and thus the consequences for the
labour market via a regular reporting system
(Provincie Limburg 2011b; Statencommissie
voor het Economisch Domein 2011).
The promises of the Executive were suffi-
cient to bring the plans to the provincial
states where the decisions had to be made.
During the meeting, the members of the pro-
vincial states no longer had substantial cri-
tique on the campus plans and on the
province’s financial commitment, an invest-
ment of about e65 million. However, because
none of the parties in the consortium of
DSM, UM and the Province of Limburg
wanted to directly invest in real estate, a real
estate company was established with the
three parties as the only shareholders. The
Province would participate in 80 per cent of
the investments and DSM and UM would be
responsible for 10 per cent each (Provincie
Limburg 2011c; Statencommissie voor het
Economisch Domein 2011). Financial resour-
ces were enrolled and a stable network – as
detailed in the interessement phase –
materialised.
Mobilisation: the Limburg Campus Plan and
tickets to Limburg’s bright future – The cre-
ated network was represented through the
launch of a joint campus plan. This ‘Lim-
burg Campus Plan’ was discussed at length
in the media through joint press releases of
the consortium, and it was publicly presented
to the minister of EZ in The Hague with
much media fanfare (Provincie Limburg
2011a), including ‘4D movies’ and interviews
with all the consortium’s leading figures (e.g.
CampusplanLimburg 2011).
In 2011, the campus master plans were fur-
ther translated into business plans, and at
the start of 2012, these plans were discussed
in the provincial states and they approved
the financing of another e34,650,000. Rang-
ing from loans to participations, these funds
were for the real estate of the Chemelot cam-
pus, the participation of a new venture fund
(Limburg Ventures II), the development of a
science programme and the establishment of
advanced shared services on the Chemelot
site (enabling technologies) (Provincie Lim-
burg 2012a, 2012b).
Ultimately, these decisions by the provin-
cial states, together with the internal deci-
sions of DSM and UM, led to the creation of
Chemelot Vastgoed (real estate) CV (Limited
partnership) on 16 October 2012, owned for
almost 80 per cent by the Province of Lim-
burg (Provincie Limburg 2013). This meant
that DSM was successfully tied to the region,
and with the launch of a new brand in 2014,
‘Brightlands’, a representative spokesperson
was created for the network of DSM, UM,
Chemelot Vastgoed, the Chemelot Campus,
the Maastricht Health Campus and the Prov-
ince of Limburg (Brightlands 2014).
CONCLUSION
This paper dealt with the issue of policy com-
petition that comes with an entrepreneurial
governance style and picking ‘winners’ and
‘losers’. More specifically, it dealt with the
balancing act of a regional government
between unfair competition on the one
hand, and the looming retreat of a multina-
tional on the other. These issues were
explored in a region in decline: the Dutch
Province of Limburg. The analysis drew
upon an analytical framework developed by
Callon (1986), Law (1992, 2008) and Latour
(1986, 2005), and focused upon the various
moments of translation to understand the
stabilisation of a network dedicated to the
binding of a multinational to the region.
Initially in 2005, the DSM Research Cam-
pus in Geleen was a private real estate devel-
opment of DSM to counterbalance DSM’s
empty real estate caused by its switch from
bulk chemistry to life sciences and materials.
Until then, the Province was not engaged in
campus development but only in cluster poli-
cies. The problematisation that was formu-
lated by the provincial civil servants was
triggered by DSM’s Copernicus operation:
how to bind DSM to the region? Next, a
moment of translation, interessement, con-
sisted of various ways to involve other actors,
such as the province, DSM, UM to create a
network. This was carried out through the
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concept of ‘campus development’, a new pol-
icy practice dedicated to the strengthening
of R&D infrastructure. Important in the inter-
essement phase was the aligning with the
national discourse to justify the campus pol-
icy for the Provincial States of Limburg. Dur-
ing the third moment, enrolment, actors
were enrolled to form a network around
campus development, and specifically around
the DSM campus ‘Chemelot’ in Geleen and
the Health Campus in Maastricht. Plans were
developed by a consortium of DSM, UM and
the provincial civil servants, which had to
pass the provincial states. Through aligning
with the national discourse on campuses (see
Figure 1 and Kooij 2015), and threats that
DSM would leave the region, the plans were
politically approved which led to the provin-
ce’s active participation in the real estate
development of the Chemelot Campus for an
80 per cent share. Mobilisation occurred in
the first instance through representatives
from the consortium, but soon through the
launch of a new spokesperson called ‘Bright-
lands’ which represented the campus network
and helped to stabilise it.
In conclusion, the campus case in Limburg
shows that overcoming the issues of policy
competition was realised through a set of
strategies that worked on network-building
within the province, as well as networking
with national discourses on campus develop-
ment. Both network-building internally within
the region, and externally to assure alignment
with broader policy discourses was crucial in
creating a stable actor-network that could
channel resources towards two ‘winners’, that
is, Chemelot and Health Campus Maastricht.
The role of the civil servants in this matter
was crucial in the stabilisation of the networks,
although their capacities stem from their net-
worked position instead of unique talents.
They worked ‘behind the screens’ to develop
a new policy tool to bind businesses to the
region, which was at the same time politically
acceptable. This policy innovation was only
possible through the networking of the actors,
through which practices and ideas from other
campuses were translated into new financial
constructions to invest in real estate to bind
multinational DSM to the region. If under-
stood through an ANT-lens, the translation
processes around spatial-economic concepts
show that seemingly innocent concepts have
far reaching economic consequences for a
region. It allows us to understand the far
from straightforward issues of governments in
attempts to strengthen their territories, and in
this case, that innovative policy concepts
needed to be developed to comfort the vested
interests within the region.
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